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Governance Agenda for Sub-Saharan Africa 
Issues and Challenges 
 
Andrew M Kerandi, Carleton University 
School of Public Policy and Administration, PhD Candidate 
 
Poor governance is increasingly being cited as one of the most important factors contributing to 
poor economic performance in most developing countries.  The World Bank has repeatedly 
argued that poor economic performance in most developing countries, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), is attributed to poor governance.  The issue of governance was first raised 
in 1988 in the World Bank report evaluating ten years of structural adjustment lending 
experience.  The report noted that “severe institutional and managerial weaknesses in the public 
and private sector have proved unexpectedly serious as constraints to better performance” 
(World Bank, 1988: 3).  The issue of “good governance” was further amplified by the 1989 
World Bank report on SSA when the crisis in the region was termed as a “crisis of governance” 
(World Bank, 1989).  International financial institutions (IFIs) have since then focused on 
improving the effectiveness of public sector institutions and the performance of public policies. 
As observed by Naim (1999), the rediscovery of institution has become the key focus of IFIs in 
as far as reforms are concerned.  Naim explains that “no speech or policy paper could be written 
about market reform without including a fashionable reference to the need to strengthen 
institutions” (Naim, 1999:12). 
 IFIs have repeatedly justified their involvement in promoting governance in developing 
countries arguing that it falls directly within their mandate and expertise (IMF, 2003).  The IMF 
states that it “places great emphasis on good governance when providing policy advice, financial 
support, and technical assistance to its 184 member countries” (IMF, 2002).  On its part, the 
World Bank says that its fundamental role is to help countries work better and it cannot afford to 
turn away when “a country is plagued by deeply dysfunctional public institutions that limit 
accountability, set perverse rules of the game, and are incapable of sustaining development” 
(World Bank, 2004). 
 Since the 1990s both multilateral and bilateral donors have factored governance agendas 
into their financial assistance to developing countries.  Many governance projects or initiatives 
have emerged over the years with the aim to promote democracy, reduce corruption, increase 
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transparency, and expand human capabilities (World Bank, 1997).  For instance, Santiso (2002) 
notes that since 1996 World Bank has been actively involved in over 600 governance-related 
programs in 95 countries and is involved in supporting significant programs of governance and 
public sector reform in 50 countries. Other donors are also doing the same and thus leading to 
increased focus in governance agendas for most countries in the SSA region (Grindle, 2004). 
 The increasing importance of governance agenda raises several questions that require 
further study and analysis.  What are the key issues that will affect the success of these 
governance initiatives?  Will these initiatives succeed in ultimately eradicating poverty in most 
of these developing countries and improving their economic performance?  Should governance 
agendas be a top priority for countries in the SSA region?  Although the intent and objectives of 
these governance initiatives is highly desirable, they are inherently unrealistic and their 
implementation faces serious challenge for the governments.  These challenges include reducing 
poverty levels (which have shown a persistent increase over the years and directly undermine 
good governance initiatives); institutionalizing the rule of law; and arresting the spread of 
HIV/AIDS (which currently poses serious threats to good governance).  These challenges are 
closely interrelated and clearly will determine the success of these governance initiatives.  This 
paper argues that, instead of emphasizing the governance agendas (which are inherently slow and 
long term in nature), efforts should be more focused on minimizing the impact of the challenges 
mentioned above (i.e., poverty, legal reform, and HIV/AIDS).  This paper will discuss these 
challenges and briefly highlight how they will impact on good governance.  But before I discuss 
each of these challenges, I will highlight (i) the complexities involved in defining the term “good 
governance”, and (ii) the unrealism embedded in the governance agenda. 
 
I: The Meaning of Good Governance 
The terms “governance” or “good governance” have no universal meaning.  Ahrens (2001) 
observes that “there is no clear or settled ideas about how effective governance should be 
suitably defined, let alone how key governance related issues can be appropriately incorporated 
into externally-financed programmes of policy reform” (Ahrens [2001:54] as cited in Santiso, 
2002).  In spite of the lack of an agreed usage of the term “governance”, many multinational and 
bilateral donors and other development practitioners have attempted to provide working 
definitions for the term.  The World Bank defined governance as “the institutional capability of 
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public organizations to provide the public and other goods demanded by a country’s citizens or 
their representatives in an effective, transparent, impartial, and accountable manner” (World 
Bank, 2000:48). To this end, the World Bank views good governance as demonstration of 
“predictable, open and enlightened policy making (that is, transparent process); a bureaucracy 
imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; 
and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law” 
(Thomas, 2004:4).  
 The IMF defines governance as “all aspects of the way a country is governed, including 
its economic policies and regulatory framework” which includes ensuring the rule of law, 
improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption (IMF, 
2003). 
Panday (2004) argues that governance should be viewed from both domestic and 
international perspectives.  He further contends that “any country that is dependent on aid for 
development has to account to the donors for its state of governance and do what is necessary for 
improvement, both as an end and a means of development” (Panday, 2004:42). Toward this end, 
the African Development Bank (AfDB), the first regional multilateral development bank to adopt 
an official strategy on governance, defines governance within a global context.  AfDB’s report 
on governance argues that governments should “find a balance between taking advantage of 
globalization and providing a secure and stable social and economic domestic environment” 
(AfDB, 2000:3).  Thus, AfDB defines governance as “a process referring to the manner in which 
power is exercised in the management of the affairs of a nation, and its relations with other 
nations”.  This is particularly appropriate in view of the fact that tackling some of the problems 
related with governance requires actions at the global level.  
 There are also divergent views on what constitutes good governance.  AfDB views good 
governance as “sound development management” based on five interrelated pillars: 
accountability, transparency, combating corruption, participation and an enabling legal/judicial 
framework (AfDB, 2004).  In addition, World Bank’s researchers, Kaufmann and Kraay (1999) 
express similar views and have identified the main dimensions of good governance as: voice and 
accountability (which includes civil liberties); political stability and absence of violence; 
government effectiveness (which includes the quality of policy making and public service 
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delivery); regulatory quality; rule of law (which includes protection of property rights and 
independence of the judiciary); and control of corruption. 
 Governance can be broad and have different means and approaches towards its 
attainment.  But there seems to be a general consensus that good governance is a major 
ingredient to economic development.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) argues that good, effective public governance helps to strengthen 
democracy and human rights, promote economic prosperity and social cohesion, reduce poverty, 
enhance environmental protection, ensure the sustainable use of natural resources and deepen the 
confidence in government and public administration (OECD, 2005).  Furthermore, Kaufman et al 
(1999) described governance as “tradition and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised for the common good”.  Nyong’o (2001) expresses similar views, arguing that good 
governance should be assessed based on how effective governments perform their work and 
promote public good.  
 In short, good governance is considered to lead to sustainable development. Keefer and 
Knack (1995)’s study on the role of institutions on economic development found that good 
governance, in the form of institutions that establish a predictable, impartial, and consistently 
enforced set of rules for investors, is crucial for the sustained per capita income growth of poor 
countries.  It is for this reason that multilateral donors such as the World Bank and IMF have 
been actively involved in governance initiatives in most developing nations including those from 
the SSA region.  The main focus of IFIs has thus been in assisting African governments to 
create, protect, and enforce property rights; to provide a sound macroeconomic regime; and to 
create institutions that limit state capacity for arbitrary action in order to improve its ability to 
support broad-based markets (World Bank, 2002:99-101). 
 
II: Unrealism in Governance Agendas 
The governance agendas seem to be unrealistic and difficult to implement.  There are two factors 
that make most of the governance initiatives unrealistic. First, the governance agendas have 
assumed that most of the governance problems confronting developing countries can be tackled 
through a technical approach.  And secondly, governance agendas pursued in most SSA 
countries are too broad and ambitious to realize any meaningful benefits.  I will now discuss 
further these two factors. 
 5
Inappropriate Technical Approach 
The implementation of most governance initiatives has embraced a functionalist or technical 
approach.  The basic assumption being employed in tackling governance problems in most 
developing countries is that “technical solutions can solve political problems” (Santiso:2002:13).  
This approach embraces the rational model of decisionmaking that assumes that policy is created 
in a fairly orderly sequence of stages.  The approach views policy as an outcome of a sphere of 
rational analysis, while it considers politics as a sphere of irrationality. While this simplistic 
reasoning has worked in some countries, it has and will most likely not deliver any meaningful 
results in most countries. For instance, most multilateral donors, especially the WB and IMF, 
firmly believe that holding multi-party elections is usually taken as a proof of the existence of 
good democratic governance.  Although this is possible in some contexts, it does not deliver fair 
representation in most African countries where party affiliation tends to follow tribal lines.  
Nyong’o argues, 
elections, by themselves, are not enough. A democratic political culture involves deeper 
participation at local levels, less concentration of political power at the center, 
institutionalization of the rule of law and respect for human rights, including social rights.                                       
(Nyong’o, 2002:6)   
 
Governance initiatives like this that extricate policy from the realities of the political landscape 
in these countries are far fetched and will most certainly fail to deliver the expected results.  
Governance agendas must take into consideration the political realities existing in most of these 
developing nations.  IFIs seem to place more emphasis on economic dimensions of governance 
and ignore the political dimensions (IMF [1997] as cited in Santiso [2002]).  Jayasuriya and 
Hewison (2004: 571) also found that most governance projects aim to shape and discipline social 
conduct within the civil society and mainly serve “to promote consensus over economic and 
social reform through mechanisms that enable the technocratic management of social conflict”.  
The focus of these projects is on “government effectiveness” ignoring the “legitimacy of 
government”.  Legitimacy of the government refers to accepting the government as “correct, 
appropriate and or right” (Brinkerhoff, 2005:5).  The issue of legitimacy of the government is 
another challenge confronting governance agenda in most developing countries as discussed 
under section III.2. 
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Too Broad and Ambitious 
Most governance agendas are too broad and inherently ambitious, posing insurmountable 
implementation challenges as a result.  A review of African PRSPs by UNCTAD revealed that 
most countries have many governance-related reforms all pursued simultaneously. As per the 
UNCTAD report, governance agendas included: 
 
[A]nti-corruption measures; improved, more participatory and accountable public 
administration; transparency in the preparation and monitoring of budgetary 
expenditures; legal reforms aiming at securing property rights and strengthening 
institutions that affect private sector activity; reforming procurement systems: rule of 
law; human rights; or briefly the “architecture of the state”. (UNCTAD, 2002:51)   
 
UNCTAD argues that the “implementation of such an all-encompassing and ambitious agenda, 
pursued through loan and debt-relief conditionalities would require far-reaching changes in 
African systems of government, including major constitutional changes” (UNCTAD, 2002:51). 
These broad-based ambitious governance agendas have over-stretched most developing 
countries, in terms of time and resources.  Grindle (2004) expresses similar views pointing out 
that governance agendas pose serious difficulties as guides to development.  Grindle (2004) 
argues that 
getting good governance calls for improvements that touch virtually all aspects of the 
public sector – from institutions that set the rules of the game for economic and political 
interaction, to decision-making structures that determine priorities among public 
problems and allocate resources to respond to them, to organizations that manage 
administrative systems and deliver goods and services to citizens, to human resources 
that staff government bureaucratic arenas. Getting good governance at times implies 
changes in political organization, the representation of interests, and processes for public 
debate and policy decision making. Not surprisingly, advocating good governance raises 
a host of questions about what needs to be done, when it needs to be done, and how it 
needs to be done. (Grindle, 2004:526) 
 
Under these circumstances it has become demanding for most governments to make any 
reasonable progress in their governance.  Grindle (2004) observes that there is little guidance on 
prioritization and sequence of execution.  Although most African governments are taking the 
lead role in governance agendas through initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), agendas are usually defined by the international development 
community and the list of reforms wanted is long and continues to grow over time.  As shown in 
Table 1 below, the requirements related to governance reforms for a typical developing country 
have increased from 45 in 1997 to 116 in 2003.  This clearly places an overwhelming burden on 
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resource-starved countries. Grindle provides a plausible argument for re-defining good 
governance, pointing out that 
 
there is no technical or easy fixes to what is inevitably a long, slow, reversible, and 
frustrating path toward better performing governments, but there may be ways of 
reducing the burden on those attempting to undertake the journey. (Grindle, 2004: 527) 
 
Grindle (2004:527) has proposed a move from “good governance” to “good enough 
governance”, where the latter means a “condition of minimally acceptable government 
performance and civil society”. The focus should be on a few things that can be done to move 
economies forward in terms of eradicating poverty and improving people’s standard of living.  
 
Table 1: The Good Governance Agenda (A count of governance items based on Items Referred to in World 
Development Reports)  
 Examples of Governance Items 1997 1998 1999/
00 
2000/
01 
2001/
02 
2002/
03 
Characteristics of good 
governance 
Checks and balances in government, 
decentralization, efficient/equitable/independent 
judiciary, free press, sound regulatory system, etc 
18 17 16 19 21 25 
Institutions for good 
governance  
Bank and finance regulation, civil service, market 
efficiency, managing decentralization, participation, 
transparent budgeting, etc. 
8 11 10 17 21 21 
Specific laws Trademark protection, enforcement of contracts, 
biodiversity, foreign investment, labour standards, 
intellectual property rights, etc. 
4 14 6 9 16 9 
Specific policies Land reforms, land policy, capital markets, 
community development, downsizing bureaucracy, 
fisheries, insurance, social safety nets, etc. 
6 10 13 20 22 20 
Specific services Services for: HIV/AIDS, communications, public 
transportation, safe water, legal aid for the poor, 
microcredit, targeted transfers, etc. 
7 17 12 22 11 20 
Broad strategies for 
achieving specific goals 
Strategies for: asset creation for the poor, capacity 
building in the public sector, empowering the poor, 
engaging the poor, environment protection, 
knowledge development, private sector 
development, etc.  
2 9 9 19 9 21 
Total  45 78 66 106 100 116 
Source: Grindle, 2004:528 (Modified Slightly) 
 
III: Issues and Challenges Facing SSA Governance Agendas 
There are many challenges facing developing countries in implementing “good governance” 
initiatives.  It is not possible to discuss exhaustively all these challenges.  I will focus on the 
following challenges that I consider to be the most important challenges confronting governance 
agendas today in SSA.  These challenges are (1) reducing poverty levels, (2) implementing 
constitutional reforms and institutionalizing the rule of law, and (3) arresting the spread of 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
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III.1: Increasing Poverty Levels and Good Governance 
Perhaps one of the most important challenges facing governance agenda in most developing 
countries is poverty.  Poverty is a major obstacle to effective public governance (Yusuf and 
Stiglitz [2000] and Rodrik [1998]).  The widening gap between the poor and the rich has been 
the main cause of some of the civil wars and/or domestic conflicts that are common in most 
developing countries, especially in the SSA region. And yet poverty levels have continued to 
increase steadily over the years.  UNCTAD (2002) reports that the people living below US$1 per 
day in the SSA region has increased by approximately 46%, that is, from 217 million in 1997 to 
291 million in 1998.  The report further explains that 
 
the proportion of the population living on less than US$1 a day in the least developed 
countries of Africa has increased continuously since 1965-1969, rising from an average 
of 55.8 per cent in those years to 64.9 per cent in 1995-1999. (UNCTAD, 2002:2) 
 
Increased inequality undermines public governance in two ways.  First, the poor are placed in a 
position where they cannot make any positive contribution to the economic development of these 
nations.  A major ingredient to effective public governance is having the mechanism of voice – 
to be heard and make contribution to the decision making process (Rodrik, 1998). And secondly, 
it creates an unstable environment conducive to civil strife and domestic conflicts.  It is for this 
reason that good governance is widely viewed as an essential ingredient for alleviating poverty.  
But the key problem is having a governance agenda as a condition for reducing widespread 
poverty.  This has been and continues to be a daunting task for most developing countries and in 
particular for those tackling poverty as a condition for debt relief.  Table 2 below provides a 
World Bank summary of the dimension of poverty and governance – a guideline prepared to 
assist countries identify governance issues that must tackled in order to reduce poverty.  Grindle 
(2004) explains why this approach will not work, arguing that governance agendas should not be 
used a mechanism for reducing poverty: 
 
[A]mong them are the poorest countries in the world.  Almost by definition their 
institutions are weak, vulnerable, and very imperfect; their decision-making spaces are 
constricted by the presence of international actors with multiple priorities, their public 
organizations are bereft of resources and are usually badly managed; those who work for 
government are generally poorly trained and motivated.  Frequently, the legitimacy of 
poor country governments is questionable; their leadership may be venal and their 
commitments to change undermined by political discord; their civil societies may be 
disenfranchised, deeply divided, and ill equipped to participate effectively in politics.  In 
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such contexts, getting good governance as a route towards poverty reduction can 
overwhelm the commitment of even the most energetic reformers. (Grindle, 2004:526) 
 
Nyong’o (2001) argues that the priority for such countries should be on poverty reduction in 
order to empower the poor to make a positive contribution to the governance agenda. Nyong’o 
points out that 
 
the challenge for good governance in Africa needs to begin by recognizing and accepting 
that the legitimacy of any government of a modern democratic republic must begin with 
taking into account the basic needs of its citizens in terms of food, shelter, clothing, 
education, health, security and social solidarity or human dignity.                                                                              
(Nyong’o, 2001:2) 
 
Table 2: Dimensions of Poverty and Good Governance 
Poverty Governance Issues 
Empowering the poor Rules for seeking and holding public office 
- Fair, transparent national electoral processes 
- Power-sharing arrangements to ensure stability in heterogeneous societies 
Oversight by political societies 
- Parliamentary oversight with independent audit institutions 
- Budget that is credible signal of government policy intentions 
- Pro-poor policies 
- Sound institutions for local and national representation 
Improving coverage, 
efficiency, and sustainability of 
basic services 
Adequate, predictable resources for sectors, local authorities 
- Pro-poor budget priorities for service provision 
- Stable intergovernmental transfers with hard budget constraints 
- Hierarchical and transparent budgeting processes 
Demarcation of responsibilities for delivery 
-  Assignment of responsibilities according to subsidiary principle  
- Capable and motivated civil servants 
- Merit-based recruitment and competitive pay 
- Hiring to fill real needs, within a hard budget constraint 
- Public service that earns respect 
Accountability downward 
- Publication of accounts for local-level authorities 
- Dissemination of basic data on performance 
- Mechanisms for client feedback, including report cards and client surveys 
Flexible delivery 
- Involvement of civil servants and private (for profit) partners 
Development of local capacity 
- Incentives to deploy staff to poor and remote areas 
- Appropriate autonomy in deploying staff 
Increasing access to markets Legal and regulatory framework 
- Enforcement of antidiscrimination legislation  
- Incentives for deepening of credit and land markets 
Methods for reducing exclusion  
- Enforcement of legislation against barriers to entry 
- Provision of information on labor and credit markets 
Demarcation of responsibilities and budgeting 
- Procedures to support development and maintenance of infrastructure (e.g. 
rural roads) to enable physical access to markets  
Providing security from 
economic shocks, corruption, 
crime, and violence 
Rules for sound economic management 
- Hard budget constraint for subnational and aggregate fiscal discipline 
- Efficient administration of tax and customs 
- Independent central bank to carry out monetary policy 
- Safeguards against economic vulnerability  
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Poverty Governance Issues 
- Recognition of property rights over physical assets 
- Access to speedy social insurance and other services through hub-and-spoke 
arrangements 
- Enforcement mechanisms 
- Independent and adequately funded court system 
- Access to speedy recourse and redress 
- Reliable and competent police 
- Efficient courts with competent judiciary and legal personnel 
- Alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution 
Source: Holmes, et al / World Bank (2001)   
 
 This approach of having good governance as an ingredient to poverty reduction is 
problematic.  First, the consolidation of good governance can take a great deal of time (Grindle, 
2004).  Furthermore, Naim (1999) argues that these reforms are more complex because they 
require the involvement of a larger number of government agencies and social actors, and 
therefore the informational and coordination demands are more intense.  For this reason, 
governance related conditionalities take a “long and, at times, painful historical processes and 
many that are now regarded as prerequisites of successful economic development were 
outcomes, rather than the causes, of economic development in today’s advanced countries” 
(UNCTAD, 2002:52).  Grindle (2004) has also pointed out that historically, many factors 
currently being considered preconditions for development were actually consequences of it.  Ha-
Joon Chang (2001) as cited in Grindle (2004) demonstrated that considerable economic 
development in developed countries occurred long before these countries had fully 
institutionalized democracies, modern financial institutions, and extensive social welfare 
services. Also Rodrick (1998) has argued that growth is often unleashed by relatively few policy 
changes and that institutional innovations can be introduced in the wake of reform, rather than 
serving as a precondition to it. 
 While governance reforms in most of these countries are highly desirable, they should be 
pursued independent of poverty reduction initiatives.  It is important to assess which reforms are 
encouraged and pursued because they are good for governance, and which are particularly 
relevant to poverty reduction.  But as rightly pointed out by Grindle (2004) many of the reforms 
advocated by IFIs as objectives for improving performance of governments are only 
conditionally connected to poverty reduction. Grindle (2004) further argues that 
 
the danger is that governments will expend precious capacity, resources, and political 
capital making changes that may not have much impact on poverty, however laudable the 
changes are overall. There  may be shorter term and more direct ways of increasing 
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accountability and responsiveness to the poor while longer-term institutional changes for 
general governance improvement are discussed, debated, and initiated. (Grindle, 
2004:535) 
 
Based on the above discussion, poverty reduction initiatives should take precedence over the 
inherently slow and long term governance reforms.    
 
III.2: Constitutional Reforms and Institutionalizing the Rule of Law 
Most of the governance reforms being implemented in developing countries require major 
constitutional changes.  For instance, the governance agenda issues confronting Tanzania include 
the need for a legitimate constitution; the creation of an effective legislature and a fair election 
system; the protection of human rights and the basic freedoms; and the creation of a system that 
allows for accountability, transparency, and integrity in the management of public resources and 
the participation of citizens in political, economic and social decision making (Mhina, 2002).  At 
the core of all these issues is formulating an acceptable constitution to all parties.  The process of 
making these constitutional changes acceptable to all parties is not an easy task for most 
countries.  The process of constitutional reforms has proved to be not only time and resource 
consuming but also a delicate process that threatens the existing political stability in the country.  
Sikota Wina of The Post newspaper in Zambia, argues that constitutional problems are the 
biggest barrier to development in Africa.  Wina observes that 
 
Recent developments in Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Liberia and Kenya, for example, all 
provide cases where attempts at constitution changes have been bedevilled with 
corruption, repression, tear gas and shootings resulting in loss of life.                                                                        
(The Post, November 23, 2005) 
 
In Kenya, for instance, the country is at crossroads because various factions can not agree on the 
nature of constitution reforms.  The constitutional review process has dragged for over 15 years 
and it is the most significant transition conflict in Kenya today.  The process has created great 
uncertainty that threatens the existing political stability.  The key challenge to good governance 
is to determine how to create the political will necessary to form a “new conjecture focused on 
bringing progress to all citizens” (Mhina, 2002:431).  Mhina goes on to explain that 
 
the crucial challenge to good governance in constitutionalism and rule of law is the 
maintenance of the political stability … the stability has been built on the base of 
agreement on the rules of the political game. (Mhina, 2002:431)  
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Political stability is critical for any constitution making process.  What complicates the 
constitutional reforms process is the dominating role of the political elites.  In most countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the ruling elites are unwilling to let go of the status quo that protects their 
interests and allow extensive and acceptable constitutional reforms.  The experience from most 
countries indicates that the ruling elites exclude other parties or stakeholders, especially those 
from the contending elite.  It is for this reason that even in countries where the constitutional 
reforms have taken place, the resulting changes have gone against the spirit of those seeking 
constitutional reforms.  For instance, Mhina (2002) points out those constitutional changes in 
Tanzania that called for reduction of presidential powers ended up increasing the powers of the 
president.  By not involving all parties in the constitution making process, governments 
significantly reduce the possibilities of having a political legitimacy necessary to ensure that the 
legal and bureaucratic systems function effectively, efficiently and relatively honestly (Nyong’o, 
2001). Mhina (2002:432) further explains that 
 
the danger of the lack of involvement of many parties in the drafting and passing of 
measures for constitution reform is that the document passed will lack legitimacy and 
thus will not be perceived as binding by all citizens. After all, a constitution is a social 
contract, and one party cannot draw a one-sided contract with only its own signature and 
expect other groups and citizens to accept it. (Mhina, 2002: 432) 
 
Making constitutional reform that is acceptable to all parties is a challenge that must be 
overcome by developing countries as they strive to implement their governance agendas.  All 
inclusive constitutional reforms are necessary to ensure government legitimacy that is good for 
business, job creation, income generation and hence the fight against poverty.   
 Related to the problems of making constitutional reforms in SSA, is the challenge of 
institutionalizing the rule of law. This means that a legitimate and democratic government must 
be based on the rule of law.  The key word is “legitimacy” which refers to “acceptance of a 
governing regime as correct, appropriate and/or right” (Brinkerhoff, 2005:5).  Nyong’o further 
explains what it means to institutionalize the rule of law 
 
[O]n the basis of rule and regulations laid down by the legislature, implemented by the 
executive arm of government and adjudicated by the judiciary (in the event of a dispute), 
individuals will seek to maximize their interests as citizens endowed with rights and 
obligations by the state. (Nyong’o, 2001:13)  
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Institutionalizing the rule of law requires that every citizen will accept the principles and ideals 
of citizenship as a basis of exercising his or her rights and claiming the same from the state.  This 
forms the basis of good governance.  Institutionalizing the rule of law in SSA faces two 
formidable challenges.  First, most citizens in SSA countries have what Peter Ekeh termed as the 
“two publics”.  The “first public” is where individuals have much closer ties to their family and 
clan than the state.  This has been attributed to the colonialization process whereby the state 
regarded individuals as “subjects” and not as “citizens” and as result the individuals relate to the 
government in an alienated fashion.  The “second public” relates to how the individual deals with 
the state – usually with little regard given to the obligation to obey the law.  This “politics of two 
publics” thrives in SSA and poses challenges to good governance because individuals have not 
institutionalized the rule of law.  Nyong’o explains: 
 
[A]n individual regards it as ethically correct to misappropriate government funds as long 
as this goes a long way to satisfy family and kinship demands. It is this “politics of two 
publics” which has buttressed corruption –hence growing underdevelopment and poverty 
– in spite of the existence of the plethora of laws and regulations against corruption and 
misuse of public resources. (Nyong’o, 2001:14) 
 
The problem of not observing laid down rules and regulations in most countries in SSA has 
persisted since the dawn of independence.  Many of the problems related to poor governance 
relates to the lack of institutionalizing the rule of law.  Sikota Wina of The Post daily newspaper 
in Zambia explains that 
 
over 50 countries in Africa and since the dawn of independence a few decades ago 
changes of government in most of these countries have come about as a result of failure 
to observe any laid down rules regarding the transfer of power. (The Post, 2005) 
 
The other problem with institutionalizing the rule of law relates to “engaging the citizens 
and enhancing their citizenship rights” (Nyong’o, 2001:14).  Nyong’o argues that most people in 
SSA do not recognize the significance of their citizenship.  This has worsened in the last two 
decades as most states have diminished their capability to provide essential services.  Possibly 
this is the main reason why many people in SSA have no propensity to meet public obligations 
such as paying taxes.  It is important that government create necessary incentives for people in 
order to “re-engage” them in the process of nation building.  African governments must strive to 
guarantee “citizenship rights” that must include the “rights to basic standards of living” which 
includes health, education, shelter, social security, security and human rights (Nyong’o, 2001).  
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Institutionalizing the rule of law is vital for good governance and it is a challenge that must be 
overcome in order to make progress in governance agendas. 
 
III.3: Arresting the Spread of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is now the biggest challenge facing most of the developing countries 
today.1  The pandemic continues to increase at an alarming rate.  The number of people infected 
in 2003 was estimated to be 5 million while total number people living with HIV continues to 
increase from 35 million in 2001 to 38 million in 2003 (UNAIDS2, 2004).  Of the 38 million 
adults and children estimated to be living globally with HIV/AIDS at the end of 2003, over 90% 
were located within the so-called “Third” world and more than 25 million or 66% come from 
sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS, 2004).  UNAIDS estimates that over 20 million have died since 
the first case was identified in 1981.  The UN has described this pandemic as an “emergence that 
threatens development, social cohesion, political stability, food security and life expectancy and 
imposes a devastating economic burden on the continent and the dramatic situation needs urgent 
and exceptional national, regional and international action” (World Bank HIV/AIDS).  In the 
words of former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, AIDS is “a new type of global emergency – 
an unprecedented threat to human development requiring sustained action and commitment over 
the long term” (UNAIDS, 2004).  
 The HIV/AIDS pandemic is a formidable challenge for the implementation of 
governance agendas in SSA.  De Waal (2003) argues that “the HIV/AIDS pandemic has far 
reaching consequences for governance and development” and that “the pandemic has set in 
motion processes that will transform the governance and economies of affected countries” (De 
Waal, 2003:1).  The HIV/AIDS pandemic is adversely affecting the building of good governance 
in SSA in several ways.  First, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is destroying the capacity of the most of 
these countries to deliver effective and efficient public service.  The pandemic has significantly 
reduced the life expectancy on attaining adulthood (LEA) from 40-50 years to an average of 25 
                                                 
1 The Copenhagen Consensus Project, with the cooperation of The Economist, gathered eight of the world’s leading 
economists in Copenhagen in May 2004 to discuss and prioritize solutions to 10 serious global challenges. The 8 
economists focused on how best to spend $50 billion over the next four years to address such problems as 
malnutrition and hunger, conflicts, communicable diseases, sanitation and water, and subsidies and trade barriers. 
The “dream team” of economists assigned the highest priority to measures to control and treat HIV/AIDs 
(Copenhagen, 2004).   
2 The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is meant to coordinate the activities of the seven of 
the international agencies involved in AIDS work – the World Health organization; the United Nations Development 
Program; The United Nations Children Fund; UNESCO; the World Bank, and the UN International Drug Control 
Program 
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years.  This means that the disease is killing the economically active age group leading to loss of 
talented and experienced human resources.  De Waal explains the impact of truncated LEA: 
 
[T]he running of a bureaucracy such as a ministry, a large firm or an army depends on 
staff who have not only professional skills but also many years of experience and 
extensive networks of personal contacts… There are demands for recruitment and 
training, and inefficiencies as posts are left unfilled, senior staff do the jobs of their 
absent subordinates, or inexperienced juniors are promoted rapidly. Staff absences 
increases due to illness, attending funerals and caring for the sick, while morale also 
suffers due to absenteeism and declining institutional effectiveness. (De Waal, 2003:11-
12) 
 
Second, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is undermining the capacity of these countries to generate 
government revenue necessary to provide the basic services.  The costs associated with the 
pandemic have continued to increase over the years.  These costs include the higher costs of 
recruitment, training, sick pay; costs related to the provision of health care for the infected; and 
the reduced revenue due to reduction in taxable economic activity (Moran, 2004:10).  Moran 
(2004) points out that Botswana’s HIV/AIDS related costs are approximately 7 per cent of GDP 
and is expected to increase to 17 per cent of GDP in 10 years.  Moran further argues that 
 
demands of mounting programmes for HIV prevention and AIDS treatment, alongside 
upgrading other public health provision.. at minimum $10-20 billion per annum .. and 
even if the money is available, the capacity to spend may be unavailable because not only 
are nurses and doctors dying more rapidly that they can be replaced by newly-trained 
professionals, but Africa is also exporting large numbers of health workers to the 
developed countries. (Moran, 2004:17) 
 
Finally and perhaps the most of important, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is directly undermining the 
state’s monopoly on violence.  The most adversely affected occupational categories by the 
pandemic are soldiers and policemen/women.  The HIV prevalence rates among soldiers and 
policemen is estimated to be in excess of 40% and is already contributing to the crisis in 
international peacekeeping in Africa.  For instance, the HIV/AIDS prevalence among the South 
Africa military is between 60-70 per cent; close to one third of Namibia’s 15,000-strong National 
Defence Force is infected (De Waal, 2003). 
 The Globe and Mail (November 30, 2005) notes that peacekeeping in Africa is facing an 
uncertain future because of the ravaging HIV/AIDS pandemic.  The paper reports that a quarter 
of South Africa’s National Defence Force (SANDF) – the best-equipped and best-trained 
military force on the continent – is infected with HIV/AIDS, and the disease is taking its toll. 
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The paper goes on to point out that “seven out of 10 military deaths in South Africa are AIDS 
related.  HIV/AIDS is the biggest killer of armed forces in most SSA countries and this is having 
huge implications for the region’s security (Globe and Mail [2005]; De Waal [2003]).  Clearly, 
the pandemic is diminishing the capability of SSA states to maintain peace and order. 
 De Waal (2003) argues that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is the root cause for anti-social 
behaviour common in most countries in SSA.  De Waal elaborates: 
 
[T]he pandemic is likely to increase criminal behaviour at all levels, in part because of 
the multiplying numbers of orphans, many of whom will lack adequate socialization and 
who may be unemployed. The state risks, losing its monopoly on violence. (De Waal 
2003:16) 
 
It seems the pandemic is reversing the gains that have been made in strengthening and improving 
governance over the last few decades.  Moran articulates this point, arguing 
 
HIV/AIDS impacts on the critical infrastructures that sustain the security, stability and 
viability of modern nation-states, it undermines the stability of already weakened states 
and adds to their vulnerability to extremists and terrorists. As economies and 
infrastructures falter, family and social networks fragment, mortality rises, and social and 
political unrest or conflict become more likely. At the same time, however, the effect of 
HIV/AIDS on militaries, especially in SSA, means that at the same time as rising security 
challenges are faced, the ability and capacity of militaries to cope is diminishing. (Moran, 
2004:14) 
 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is posing a serious challenge that directly undermines the building and 
strengthening of good governance.  The impact of the pandemic on human resources and 
institutional capacity is calling for African governments to re-strategize on their governance 
agendas. Governments in the SSA, through their initiatives such as NEPAD, should focus their 
energies on arresting the spread of the pandemic instead of wanting to do everything from 
market liberation to judicial reforms.  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
This paper sought to highlight some of the challenges and issues associated with the 
implementation of governance initiatives.  Although the pursuit and implementation of good 
governance is imperative in all countries of SSA, there are formidable challenges that must be 
considered and overcome in order to successfully implement governance agendas. African 
governments with the assistance of the donor community may write ambitious plans for 
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improving governance and strengthening the various institutions and yet fail to make any 
tangible benefits in terms of improving the standard of living of their citizens.  Governments 
must strive to focus their efforts and resources on achieving what is achievable and important 
within a given a timeframe.  They should set reasonable targets and focus on a few areas that are 
critical and specific to the existing conditions in a particular country.  They should also seek to 
fight poverty and empower the poor to make a positive contribution to the economic 
development of their countries.  Efforts and resources should also be targeted at raising 
awareness and the level of education so that people can understand and institutionalize the rule 
of law.  Even more important, the spread of HIV/AIDS must be arrested and contained otherwise 
all efforts and resources put into good governance will be a waste.  As argued by Grindle (2004), 
the ultimate challenge for SSA countries and the donor community at large is to “move from 
axiomatic claims about the importance of institutions to more systematic analyses of institutional 
quality and its implications for various aspects of well-being such as access of the poor to 
essential services (and their) degree of empowerment”. It is important that governments refocus 
their energies and resources in providing basic services to their citizens so as to build their 
credibility and relevance that is necessary to ensure successful implementation of their 
governance agendas. 
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